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Abstract:  This paper aims to provide insights into the effective regulation of private 
sector innovation. It coins a term – “innovation-framing regulation” – to describe a 
particular quality of the regulation that characterized much of financial regulation in 
the recent era. After briefly sketching a particular financial innovation (securitization 
and the marketing of securitized assets on the derivatives markets) it describes three 
regulatory interactions with that innovation: the Basel II Capital Accords, the Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper Crisis in Canada, and the ongoing notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process surrounding the Volcker Rule in the United States. While each 
case study is different, in each one the regulatory regime exhibits a lack of 
understanding about the phenomenon of innovation it is grappling with. The paper 
identifies three key assumptions that are ripe for re-evaluation: the notion that 
private sector innovation is beneficial, virtually by definition; the assumption that the 
regulatory moment is the crucial moment in regulatory design; and the belief that 
innovation somehow sits outside regulation and can be untouched by it. The paper 
argues that effective regulation of private sector innovation requires a clearer and 
more nuanced understanding of innovation, and engagement with the normative 
choices underpinning innovation-framing regulation.  
 
Change is inevitable, and so regulation must be able to deal with it. It is one thing –surely an 
unremarkable thing – to build in a regulatory infrastructure for managing change. We can scarcely 
conceive of law without its change-managing processes, like the statutory amendment process, or 
the “living tree” of case-by-case common law evolution. It is another thing to embrace change as 
desirable, and to try to build regulatory structures that are capable of reacting to and adapting to 
constant exogenous change. It is still another to embrace a particular kind of change – private 
sector-generated human innovation – as desirable and to locate it at the very centre of the regulatory 
project. 
The goal of this paper is to begin to investigate the effective regulation of private sector 
innovation. It coins a term – “innovation-framing regulation” – to describe a particular quality of the 
regulation that characterized much of financial regulation in the recent era. Innovation-framing 
regulation is not centrally concerned with the regulation of property rights associated with 
innovation, the domain of intellectual property law. Nor does it refer to targeted government 
programs that establish and distribute incentives to innovate, such as American NSF grants. Rather, 
innovation-framing regulation considers the nature of regulation, in fields where it has had to 
respond and adapt to subject matter that is being transformed, radically and continually, by private 
sector innovation. 
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Innovation-framing regulation considers that decentralized private sector innovation should 
be the primary driver of change. It establishes a scaffolding of overarching or meta-level regulatory 
controls. These may take the form of regulatory goals or principles cast at a high level of abstraction, 
the regulation of self-regulation through “meta-regulation” or management-based regulation, 
outcome-oriented or performance-driven regulation, or a combination thereof. Private sector 
innovation is allowed, indeed encouraged, to flourish within those structural bounds. Innovation-
framing regulation accepts, even embraces, rapid human-generated change and tries to manage the 
risks associated with it, while recognizing that one cannot know in advance precisely what shape that 
change will take. Financial sector regulation in the era between the Enron’s collapse in 2002 and the 
Credit Crunch in fall 2008 is my example here.ii The kinds of innovation that are most central to this 
account are innovations, undertaken by private actors, for private benefit (in the case of financial 
institutions, meaning greater profit through the marketing of more and more lucrative instruments), 
based on new technology that seemingly allowed those financial institutions to excise the risks 
associated with an asset from its benefits, and to slice and sell risk ever more finely.  
Innovation-framing regulation takes as starting points that (1) extensive, fast-moving and 
technically complex innovation is at least inevitable and, following the efficient market hypothesis, 
likely beneficial; (2) centralized public regulators cannot hope to keep up with private sector 
innovation, but should at least work hard to avoid stifling innovation, particularly in a competitive 
international environment; and, (3) it is possible, through innovation-framing regulation, to generate 
“simply better” regulation that imposes no real costs on anyone and requires no difficult trade-offs. 
This paper links three signal regulatory moments in the last decade of financial sector 
history, each of which can be seen as a response to a particular and powerful phenomenon: private 
sector financial sector innovation in the creation and marketing of asset-backed securitized financial 
products. The first case study looks at the innovation-framing capital adequacy regime developed 
under the Basel II Capital Accords (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for 
International Settlements 2004). The second considers the 2007 Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
(ABCP) Crisis in Canada. The third case study considers the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process following passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 in 
the United States, specifically concerning the final form of the so-called Volcker Rule. Each of these 
brief, inevitably partial, and very different case studies considers how private sector financial 
innovation intersected with the regulatory structures designed to accommodate change. While each 
example is different in its particulars, in each case the regulatory strategy failed (meaning that it did 
not perform as intended) in part because it did not take seriously enough the swamping effect that 
private sector innovation would have on regulatory structures designed to channel it.  
The first two examples, of Basel II and the ABCP Crisis, represent distinct subspecies of 
innovation-framing regulation. This paper critiques the effectiveness of innovation-framing 
regulation in the Basel II and ABCP case studies, both for the flawed assumptions underpinning 
them and because they failed to appreciate their own reflexive and change-accelerating properties. In 
the case of the Basel II Capital Accords, a series of beliefs about how innovation worked, grounded 
on the efficient market hypothesis and the presumed reliability, capacity and bona fides of private 
sector innovators as regulatory partners, created a regulatory regime that actually encouraged 
gamesmanship, excessive risk-taking and collective irresponsibility. Canada’s ABCP regulatory 
regime imagined a relatively static, bounded regulatory object that could be managed through market 
forces alone. It was virtually undone through unanticipated innovation, to which it was blind. The 
paper offers the third example, of rulemaking following the Dodd-Frank Act concerning the Volcker 
Rule, as a broader cautionary tale. The choice by legislators to allocate so much important decision-
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making to the regulatory level, rather than the political one, was a political choice. It seems to have 
been heavily influenced by the three assumptions mentioned above, as well as by a desire to avoid 
making difficult normative choices in a political arena. The Volcker Rule example suggests that the 
notion of innovation-as-beneficial has seeped so fully into political dialogue that really, it is only the 
details that are left to be worked out. Yet, the decision to allocate so much decision-making to the 
regulatory level also virtually guaranteed that deliberation about the final form of the Volcker Rule 
would take place in highly technocratic terms, in which the public at large could not meaningfully 
participate. Thus, the contemporary fixation on innovation paralyzes even the consultative 
mechanisms designed to ensure the public-regarding nature of regulations. 
Taken together, the case studies also demonstrate that from the perspective of the regulated 
entity (here, generally for-profit, private sector, transnational financial institutions) these 
environments have much in common. In each case, regulatory structures are influenced by 
background assumptions about the relationship between innovation and regulation that deserve 
closer examination. At a technical level, private sector innovation also opened up unexpected 
interstitial spaces, in the very midst of regulatory action (Bartley 2011), within which capable, well-
resourced, well-connected private actors were able to shape outcomes in their own interests. We 
know this – consider the law and economics literature on gap-filling in incomplete contracts – but 
the point applies to regulation too (Krawiec 2003). Consequential spaces exist within definitions and 
assumptions, in the structural spaces around regulation and in the temporal spaces before and after 
regulation (including the technical space where structured financial instruments are built). While 
innovation may be inevitable, and sometimes may well be beneficial, devising sound regulatory 
responses to it requires a more nuanced understanding of context, and a reappraisal of who benefits 
from innovation and to what relative extent. Thinking about regulation in terms of its innovation-
framing qualities sheds light on an under-analyzed attribute of modern regulation. It helps us to see 
the influence of our normative stance on innovation, and it helps us to see the practical, technical 
impact of innovation on our regulatory structures.  
The Innovation: Derivatives & Securitization 
Neither securitization nor derivatives (which are used to construct and to sell securitized 
products) are particularly new inventions. Both used decades-old tools, such as options, swaps, and 
special purpose entities, except more extensively or in new arenas in response to new opportunities.iii 
It has been their multiplication and diffusion that has raised challenges in recent years.  
The financial crisis is too multifaceted to describe here, but it is possible to talk about 
financial innovation based on a general understanding of a particular innovation, which also 
contributed directly to the subprime mortgage crisis and credit crunch in the United States and 
ultimately to the global financial crisis. That innovation was the securitization of bundled consumer 
debt and the sale of the income flow from these securitized assets (boosted and tweaked by the 
addition of other financial instruments, side deals and guarantees) in tranches on the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives markets. Securitization made maturity transformation possible – that is, 
transforming fixed-rate, long term assets such as residential mortgages into immediately realizable 
and marketable assets. This unleashed the present value of these assets and, through aggregation and 
actuarial risk analysis, helped quantify, disperse, and manage certain kinds of risk.   
In order to sell these securitized instruments (which involved obtaining a credit rating from 
an approved credit rating agency, and taking other steps to make the products attractive to the 
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market), financial institutions had to evaluate the risks associated with them. By the turn of the 
millennium, this risk assessment had necessarily become the responsibility of highly sophisticated 
and complex modeling and analytical software.  Financial institutions used proprietary risk modelling 
software to allocate, shift, and spread the risks associated with the products they were marketing. 
Reciprocally, the widespread use of computer-based risk modeling allowed financial institutions to 
develop and market to consumers increasingly complex financial products. It was a competitive 
business, and a lucrative one, in which for a time financial institutions profited virtually whenever 
they brought new structured products to market. Profitability was front-loaded, meaning that there 
was a large first mover advantage for those bringing a new product to market for the first time. A 
financial product’s profitability fell off dramatically once it had been imitated. The pace of financial 
innovation soared as a result, as did the largely unregulated OTC derivatives market on which these 
products and their component parts traded. 
As it turned out, the software that many financial institutions used to assess such things as 
the default risk on subprime mortgages was often badly flawed (Gerding 2009, 168-179). Moreover, 
the increasing reliance on code to manage risk, or as Erik Gerding has described it the “outsourcing” 
of risk analysis to “the new financial code”, also submerged and obscured contestable assumptions 
about the nature of the products being sold, removing those assumptions from the ambit of human 
judgment (Gerding 2009, 153-159; Bamberger 2009). In hindsight, it is clear that in the run-up to the 
financial crisis, as a function of the automation of many risk and compliance processes, human 
beings actually had considerably less conscious, concrete knowledge about how they measured their 
own risk and compliance than was generally realized. To make matters worse, financial institutions 
and mortgage lenders had little incentive to be prudent in their investments, either in entering into 
underlying loan agreements (because under the originate-to-distribute model, they no longer held 
those underlying assets) or in devising new derivative products for sale (because there was a high 
international demand for any investment that could offer good returns, as these products did) 
(Bernanke 2005).  
We should remember that financial innovation, including securitization, can produce 
important social benefits. The fact that lenders such as banks and community credit unions can 
securitize long term assets and trade in the derivatives markets means that it is far easier than it used 
to be for small business owners to obtain loans, for individuals to obtain credit, and for the “real” 
Main Street economy to grow (Davidson 2012) – even while it also enriches the “virtual” Wall Street 
world of finance. Derivatives make it possible to slice risk more finely, leading to the more efficient 
use of capital (Gilson and Whitehead 2008). They can be used to hedge and offset virtually any risk 
including those associated with changing costs of supplies, commodity prices, foreign exchange 
rates, contractual counterparty default and even crop failure. As such they have become essential 
tools not only for sophisticated international financial institutions, but also for many small 
businesses engaged in contractual relationships, commodity sellers (including farmers and resource 
companies), and entities doing work cross-border. 
At the same time, derivatives and securitization have undermined the means by which 
finance has traditionally been made accountable – to regulation, to the public and the political 
process, to economic forces, and in corporate law. They have dramatically increased systemic risk 
and engendered a level of technical complexity that pushes the limits of our regulatory capacity, at 
least based on current tools. They have tied the same small business owners that use these tools to 
hedge their business risks to powerful, poorly understood global systemic forces far beyond their 
control. Ultimately, financial innovation has allowed businesses and financial institutions to hedge 
risk and increase their own short-term certainty – right up to the point at which it turns out that the 
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risk was never eliminated, but only shifted, and that in times of systemic crisis it ends up being 
shifted all the way to taxpayers and nations.  
Financial innovation and its attendant complexity are challenging background conditions for 
any regulatory regime. The narratives below consider three moments at which regulation, in 
different forms, intersected with that innovation. 
What is Innovation-Framing Regulation?  
Across subject matter areas, one of the signal shifts in regulatory theory over the past two 
decades has been a move to a new, more variable and interactive kind of state regulatory apparatus. 
Regulatory scholarship has moved beyond the floors and ceilings of traditional mechanisms to 
deploy a fuller and more variedly-stocked “regulatory toolkit” (Morgan and Yeung 2007). What we 
might call “flexible regulation” today covers a range of distinct approaches including responsive 
regulation and its central strategy, enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), 
management-based regulation (Coglianese and Lazer 2003), new governance and experimentalism 
(de Búrca and Scott 2004; Sabel and Simon 2004), and meta-regulation (Parker 2002).  
While there are differences between them, the several versions of flexible regulation have in 
common that they seek to tailor regulatory tools to the specific needs of the situation at hand – to 
move away from “one size fits all” prescriptions to a more context-sensitive and dynamic approach. 
Flexible regulation aims to be outcome-oriented, pragmatic, and data-driven, using empirical 
performance measures to assess its own performance as well as regulated actors’, and transcending 
conceptual boundaries (national, federal, public/private) where evidence suggests those boundaries 
are overdrawn or counterproductive. It aims to be better at recognizing and leveraging compliance-
enhancing non-legal forces – including normative architectures and community pressures (Cover 
1983; Bernstein 1993; Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2003), individual morality (Tyler 2006) 
and market forces (Kahn 1971) – both by themselves and as leveraged by legal mechanisms (Lessig 
1998; Héritier and Lemkuhl 2011). Perhaps above all, flexible regulation seeks to be iterative, 
meaning to be able to register change in its environment, develop contingent strategies and 
provisional responses, and adjust its behavior based on its own learning. As Orly Lobel has said, 
“the idea of dynamic [regulatory] innovation is intrinsic to the theory” (Lobel 2004 at 354).iv 
In some areas, flexible regulation emerged partly in response to the actual success of 
traditional regulation. Having made advances in areas such as civil rights, employment and housing 
discrimination and egregious corporate misconduct using bright-line, top-down public rules, 
equality-seeking groups and progressive scholars ran into the limits of law to accomplish more 
(Stone 1975). Some sought ways to go beyond law and beyond the crabbed, compliance-oriented 
mindset that accompanied it, and to use more sophisticated regulatory design to try to address 
subtler, deeply engrained problems.  
In other arenas, it was private sector innovation that directly and explicitly drove regulatory 
innovation. All versions of flexible regulation try to respond to exogenous change and to establish 
regulatory scaffolding that can handle continual and unpredictable change. What distinguishes what 
I would call “innovation-framing regulation” is that – sometimes intentionally and self-consciously 
and sometimes not – it locates private sector innovation at the core of its regulatory model. 
Particularly around the regulation of structured finance, using derivatives and securitization, the 
forms that innovation-framing regulation have taken are heavily informed by the technical 
complexity of the subject matter, the rapid pace of industry-driven change, and the perceived relative 
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capacity of regulator to regulated entity. A key assumption underlying innovation-framing regulation, 
then, has been that the state was incapable of grasping or keeping up with, let alone managing or 
directing, financial innovation. The dynamicism and creativity of the financial sector, especially 
around new and complex financial technologies, seemed undeniable. 
If one starts from the view that centralized public regulators are not capable of “keeping up” 
with private sector innovation, one response might be that regulators should devise strategies that 
allow them to be effective without actually having to keep up with all industry developments. 
Prescriptions for regulatory strategies that could “steer not row” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), and 
that establish principles and goals at a high level of generality while leaving the fast-moving details to 
be filled in by private actors (Coglianese and Lazer 2003; Ford 2008), were intended as realistic 
responses to that challenge. In practice, these approaches were also influenced by transnational 
regulatory competition over highly mobile capital, which pushed regulators to try to reduce the 
“regulatory burden” at the same time. 
The crucial assumption here was that private sector innovation was at a minimum inevitable 
(and inevitably fast-moving and ever-growing) and, following the efficient market hypothesis, 
probably even beneficial. Even among non-market fundamentalists, the somewhat unexamined 
assumption in the years leading up to the financial crisis was that innovation was beneficial virtually 
by definition, since market forces would winnow out any unsound ideas (UK Financial Services 
Authority 2009). Correlatively, market actors were understood to be rational, competent and 
rationally self-interested enough that self-regulation could do a considerable amount of prudential 
and precautionary regulatory work. Particularly where regulated actors had sophisticated risk 
management systems in place, they seemed capable of managing their own risks effectively.  
Another key assumption underlying innovation-framing regulation was that it was possible 
to erect regulatory scaffolding of carefully-designed incentives and principles that, in combination 
with market discipline, would be adequate to channel private sector action to align with public 
priorities. While thinking about financial regulation in the 2002-2008 era was surely affected by 
corporatism (Skeel 2011), most regulators and scholars did not set out to deregulate the financial 
sector. Even if in retrospect it may seem to have been unrealistic, the ambition was to improve 
regulatory performance along all axes at once. The shape of innovation-framing regulation – 
principles-based, delegating details to regulated entities, relying on social and market forces to 
buttress regulatory requirements – rested on a vision of what Julia Black (2008, 9) has termed the 
“regulatory Utopia,” within which the self-examining, responsible firm, which possesses the greatest 
contextual information, helps to elaborate the detailed content of regulation through ongoing 
dialogue with a flexible and outcome-oriented regulator, in the service of the mutual goal of 
optimized regulation. For example, in describing the UK Financial Services Authority’s move to a 
more principles-based regulatory approach, Financial Services Authority Chief Executive John Tiner 
argued in 2006 that principles-based regulation produced simply “better” regulation, meaning 
simultaneously “(1) a stronger probability that statutory outcomes are secured; (2) lower cost; and (3) 
more stimulus to competition and innovation” (Tiner 2006; Briault 2007). 
I want to be clear that the financial crisis is not a story about the failure of innovation-
framing regulation as a theoretical approach, let alone about flexible regulation as a broader category. 
Financial regulation in the run-up to the crisis was not responsive regulation, new governance 
regulation, meta-regulation, or any other version of flexible regulation.  Even ignoring the 
extraordinarily poor conduct of industry actors, the main regulatory failures implicated in the crisis 
were functions of gaps in regulation, inadequate resources, the widespread underestimation of 
industry interconnectedness and systemic risk, and an ill-informed and insufficiently skeptical 
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regulatory mindset.  What I hope emerges instead is an appreciation of the enormous challenge that 
fast-moving private sector innovation presents to regulatory structures of all stripes.  
Additionally, what may have been unappreciated before the financial crisis is that the 
regulatory choice in favor of innovation-framing regulation around innovative financial products 
actually helped constitute and enlarge the very market for those products, the complexity of the 
global financial system, and the attendant risks and uncertainties. The reflexive relationship between 
these products and their regulation created something approaching a feedback loop between 
financial innovation, regulatorily-sanctioned (or ignored) rewards flowing to certain private actors, 
and more financial innovation. In other words, the porous, substantially self-regulatory structure 
built to handle vast private sector financial innovation actually – to some extent unintentionally, or 
at least uncritically – heightened the complexity it was meant to be responding to, and further 
accelerated the pace of change.  
Three Regulatory Moments 
 
Basel II as Innovation-Framing Regulation 
Since the OTC derivatives market was largely unregulated (itself an important normative 
choice, but beyond this paper’s scope), one of the first regulatory engagements with financial 
innovation occurred at the point at which financial institutions’ capital adequacy was assessed, 
through the Basel II capital adequacy standards of 2004 and the somewhat equivalent Consolidated 
Supervised Entities (CSE) Program in the United States. Securitized and derivative assets were an 
enormous part of what global financial institutions were holding by then, meaning that an important 
regulatory interaction with these products was in the context of whether they were being properly 
accounted for, for prudential regulatory purposes. 
The Basel II Capital Accord was developed to address capital adequacy maintained by global 
financial institutions. The purpose of capital adequacy standards is “prudential regulation” – that is, 
to ensure that financial institutions keep enough capital reserves on hand to cover their liabilities and 
the risks they run in the course of their business. Prudential standards aim to protect depositors, and 
also to ensure financial system stability as a whole. Basel II, enacted in 2004, sought to develop a 
more risk-sensitive metric for capital allocation. Relative to the Basel I structure that preceded it, the 
reforms were intended to reduce the scope for regulatory arbitrage and to ensure that risks were 
better quantified (Ojo 2011; Lobanov 2012).  
The Basel II standards are an example of the principles-based, outcome-oriented, 
innovation-framing turn that financial regulation took in the years between the Enron debacle in 
2002, and the credit crunch in fall 2008.v Rather than developing its own bright-line regulatory 
standards (“floors”) for capital adequacy, the Basel Committee recognized the continued fast pace of 
financial sector innovation around marketable products, and the significant role that innovation had 
played in undermining the comparatively bright line standards in Basel I. The forms of financial 
assets that had been created through financial engineering, even before 2004, were of such a varied 
and mutable nature that risk assessment had become a complex undertaking. In an attempt to 
permit private sector innovation while not forcing regulators to try, in vain, to keep up with the 
details of that innovation, Basel II developed a “three pillars” design for capital adequacy. Pillar I 
established minimum capital requirements for financial institutions, providing substantial discretion 
to what were thought to be the most high-functioning financial institutions. Pillar II established a 
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supervisory review program, for which national regulators were responsible. To supplement 
regulation and offset the greater discretion that certain financial institutions had under Pillar I, Pillar 
III required financial institutions to make extensive disclosure of their capital reserves. The idea was 
that greater disclosure would enhance transparency and make those institutions more answerable to 
disciplinary market forces. 
Especially relevant here is that under Pillar I, the largest global financial institutions were 
able to use their own internal risk assessments to evaluate the risks they were running. While a 
“standardized approach” and a “foundation approach” were available to less sophisticated 
institutions, Basel II incorporated an “advanced approach” that gave a financial institution more 
freedom to use its own systems to set risk weights. So long as the financial institution met the 
minimum organizational and risk-modeling standards set by the Basel Committee and maintained 
what was thought to be a strong control environment, it could use its own risk models to determine 
how much capital it needed to keep in reserve. The assumptions underlying the Pillar I approach 
were first, that the innovation being undertaken was socially beneficial overall or at least, that its 
expansion would impose only private, market-controlled costs and not systemic public ones; second, 
that financial institutions were in a better position to assess the risks they were running than 
regulators were; and third, that sophisticated institutions with strong control environments could be 
counted on to behave responsibly, in their own self-interest, in regard to risk and leverage. 
In the end, in response to strong competitive pressures and (correlated) flawed risk 
modeling, financial institutions’ own internal risk analytics under Basel II’s “advanced approach” 
generated much lower risk assessments than the “standardized” or “foundation” approaches did. 
Since lower capital reserves and greater leverage generate larger profits, the financial institutions that 
could use the “advanced approach” generally did so. Of course, greater leverage also entails greater 
risks. The shift to more risk-taking was exacerbated by uneven supervisory review under Pillar II. As 
the Northern Rock debacle in the United Kingdom demonstrated, not all bank supervisors 
supervised effectively (Financial Services Authority 2008). In addition, while the disclosure 
requirements under Pillar III were expected to allow market participants to gauge for themselves the 
capital adequacy of an institution, the complexity and opacity of the assets in question made real 
market discipline ineffective. In fact, equity investors actually favored more risk-taking financial 
institutions, because those financial institutions posted higher returns (Levinson 2010, 83). 
An OECD December 2010 study found that financial institution regulation based on Basel 
II Accords encouraged risk-taking and unconventional business practices, and contributed to the 
systemic shocks underlying the recent financial crisis. The study found that capital regulation based 
on risk-weighted assets encouraged innovation that was designed to circumvent regulatory 
requirements, and to shift riskier assets off the balance sheet to subsidiaries or third parties 
(Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2010). The problem was even worse in the United States. Basel II 
was not adopted by the various US federal banking agencies. However, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission essentially adopted Basel II’s Pillar I advanced approach for broker dealers 
under its jurisdiction (SEC 2004). The CSE Program was entirely voluntary, because the SEC had no 
jurisdiction over the parent corporations of those broker-dealer entities (SEC 2008). Precisely how 
much the voluntary nature of the CSE Program contributed to its failure is not clear. What is clear is 
that allowing the parent entities of US broker-dealers to use internal proprietary risk modeling 
software to assess the risks they were running contributed to a catastrophic behavioral cascade 
toward excessive risk-taking and overleverage.  
Under both Basel II and the CSE Program, beliefs about how innovation would work – 
relying as they did on the efficient market hypothesis, confidence in banks’ ability to behave in 
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rationally self-interested ways that did not implicate systemic risk, and the shared interests of 
regulators and regulated entities in a well-functioning system in the “regulatory Utopia” – proved 
flawed. 
 
ABCP in Canada: Underestimating the Impact of Innovation 
A second moment, less consequential in global terms but illuminating in regulatory ones, is 
the September 2007 Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Crisis in Canada. The crisis is 
historically interesting because it foreshadowed the larger credit crunch that followed in 2008, but 
also because the way in which ABCP was distributed in Canada demonstrates the corrosive behind-
the-scenes effect that financial engineering can have on discrete regulatory provisions. The 
commercial paper regime in Canada was innovation-framing, though not self-consciously and 
explicitly in the way that the Basel II Capital Accords were. It established a blanket exemption for 
commercial paper from certain securities law requirements, on the basis that any kind of commercial 
paper that could possibly be devised would still have to operate within well-understood practical 
limits. The ABCP regime was premised on the view that commercial paper was inherently safe, for 
reasons that were related to its short term nature and the limits of its marketability. Yet, through 
innovation, the market for commercial paper was fundamentally transformed in ways that 
undermined that view completely. 
“Commercial paper” by itself is a promissory note used to secure short-term loans (that is, 
loans due in less than 270 days). The loan is not secured by underlying collateral. Investors are 
willing to buy it on the strength of the issuer’s reputation, buttressed by a good credit rating from a 
recognized credit rating agency. For this reason commercial paper has typically been issued only by 
banks or large financial institutions, where default is very unlikely. “Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper” (ABCP) is a similar promissory note but one that is also secured by collateral. In the event 
that an ABCP issuer cannot honor the ABCP when it comes due, the investor may lay claim to the 
underlying assets. In the years leading up to the crisis in 2007, ABCP was issued by banks and other 
large financial institutions, as well as some non-bank parties.  
Under Canadian securities laws, ABCP could be distributed under an exemption from the 
disclosure and regulatory requirements that otherwise would have applied to securities distributions 
to the public (CSA, NI 45-106).vi The rationale for the exemption was that ABCP was a very safe 
investment with a very low risk of default.  That view in turn was based on a series of assumptions 
that would have been entirely reasonable in an earlier era: first, the only issuers that would be able to 
market commercial paper successfully would be very sound and reputable institutions, because no 
one would buy unsecured IOUs from anyone else. (The fact that ABCP was secured by assets 
presumably made it even safer.) Second, the risks associated with commercial paper were lower 
because the paper would mature and the investor would be paid back in 270 days or less. The 
likelihood that a reputable institution would suffer a default event within such a short time window 
was very small. Third, as a condition of the exemption, the commercial paper had received an 
acceptable rating from an approved, arm’s length credit rating agency. Finally, like the rest of the 
exempt market, product sold under the commercial paper exemption would only be marketed to 
sophisticated institutional investors. Individual “retail” investors, who needed the protection that a 
prospectus (the mandatory disclosure document associated with distributions of securities) would 
have offered because they could not do their own research, would not even be buying ABCP. 
In fact, each of these assumptions was flawed and reflected expectations about the financial 
markets that were no longer accurate (Chant 2009). First, the fact that ABCP was marketable did not 
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mean that it was safe. There was no relationship between the soundness of the financial institution 
offering the ABCP and the assets underlying the ABCP, which could often be of very poor quality. 
In particular, ABCP assets included high risk credit-default swaps (CDSs), including those on 
securitized American subprime mortgages. Moreover, financial institutions used ABCP to avoid 
capital adequacy requirements designed to ensure the institutions’ solvency: they moved long term 
credit obligations, such as mortgages, off their own balance sheets and into the ABCP conduit. 
Nevertheless ABCP was highly marketable, especially internationally, because it offered higher 
returns during an era of low interest rates (National Post 2007). Second, the short 270 day window for 
the commercial paper was irrelevant. ABCP functioned more like a highly-leveraged liquidity fund 
than like old-fashioned commercial paper. ABCP issuers had to obtain a continuing stream of 
investors into ABCP in order to pay off the holders of maturing ABCP, in a never-ending cycle of 
“rollovers”. The ABCP issuer’s solvency completely depended on there always being a larger market 
for ABCP. Third, the credit rating agencies were not the zealous independent assessors they were 
thought to be, at least in the United States.vii Fourth, purchasers of ABCP were not always 
sophisticated investors, because purchasers did not always purchase on their own behalves. 
Thousands of retail investors also found themselves invested in ABCP. (Individuals’ pensions and 
savings were also affected when their pension and investment funds participated, although those 
funds were professionally managed.) 
The market for ABCP in Canada froze completely in September 2007, after it had become 
clear that some ABCP (no one entirely knew how much) was exposed to the increasingly-toxic US 
subprime mortgage market. Once worried investors stopped buying ABCP, ABCP issuers could not 
pay note holders whose maturing ABCP notes were coming due. Retail investors disproportionately 
held frozen ABCP at that stage, since savvier institutional investors had been rushing to dispose of 
their ABCP holdings in the weeks leading up to the market freeze (Greenwood 2011). At that stage, 
as with the use of the commercial paper exemption in the first place, the gap between the 
opportunities perceived and seized by sophisticated actors, and the expectations of the regulators 
and retail investors around them, was clear.  
The ABCP story suggests that a regulatory regime that rests heavily on market discipline to 
police the boundaries of a regulatory exemption, and underestimates private innovation’s capacity to 
push those boundaries, will fail. 
 
The Volcker Rule Rulemaking Process: Innovation, Expertise and the Limits of 
Consultation  
Finally, in the present moment in the United States, we are seeing negotiations around the 
rules following the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. On its surface this is a different kind of regulatory 
moment, since it concerns administrative rulemaking procedures that are both formal and 
longstanding. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is not innovation-framing at the level of regulatory 
design, though it is change-oriented in the sense that it provides a mechanism for incorporating 
public input into anticipated regulatory changes. But rulemaking under Dodd-Frank implicates the 
same difficult questions about through what mechanisms to regulate financial innovation. The 
example also suggests that private sector financial innovation influences the rulemaking process at 
two distinct levels: at the normative/political level, in restricting the options available to politicians 
and contributing to a decision to “punt” the problem to regulators; and at the regulatory level, where 
the highly technical nature of the discussion both limits the range of possible outcomes, and the 
possibility of meaningful public input. Overall, rulemaking under Dodd-Frank has been innovation-
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framing in the choices it has not made. It has entailed no fundamental challenge to the belief that 
fast-moving private sector financial innovation carries with it benefits that cannot be compromised. 
(Although this paper focuses on the impact of innovation-framing choices, financial institutions’ 
power and influence are also important contributing factors: Ford 2011.) 
The Dodd-Frank Act takes a number of important steps in responding to the financial crisis, 
including creating a new regulatory framework for OTC derivative products (Dodd-Frank, Title 
VII). What bears particular mention here are the ongoing struggles around the what has come to be 
known as the Volcker Rule. The purpose of the Volcker Rule, as originally envisioned by former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, was effectively to insulate financial institutions’ consumer 
banking business, taking deposits from depositors, from the institutions’ own for-profit risk-taking. 
The Dodd-Frank Act is structured (and it has been criticized for this) to leave a great deal of 
important definitional work to regulatory agencies to develop. Whether or not the Volcker Rule will 
effectively insulate the bank depository function from speculative risks will depend a great deal on 
its details. The decision by law-makers to “punt” the crucial questions to the regulatory level is a 
significant one. 
Rulemaking around the Volcker Rule initially fell to the new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC), which used, as it was required to do, a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure 
as part of developing the detailed content of the rule. So far, the Volcker Rule has attracted more 
public comment than any administrative rule in history (Krawiec 2011, 22-23). The issue of bank 
risk-taking, which normally has low public salience, attracted a good deal of attention in the wake of 
the financial crisis.  
The difficulty is that lay citizens, while engaged and often angry, do not generally have the 
necessary technical financial expertise to make headway on these matters. As Kim Krawiec has 
demonstrated (Krawiec 2011), the notice-and-comment procedure around the Volcker Rule 
generated huge numbers of letters from citizens, the overwhelming majority of which were not 
detailed enough or specific enough to actually affect the final form of the rule. The vast majority of 
letters from members of the public (and 91% of all 8000 letters received) were form letters 
generated by a public interest group. Most of the rest of the letters from private individuals were 
very short – the average word count is 86 words – and not substantive.  
By contrast, financial industry comment letters were far longer and, in Krawiec’s assessment, 
“contain[ed] cogent arguments on behalf of a generally narrow interpretation of the Volcker Rule’s 
scope of prohibited activity, advance[d] detailed legal arguments relying on numerous statutes and 
cases, reference[d] the Dodd-Frank legislative history, and often contain[ed] detailed empirical data” 
(Krawiec 2011, 25-26). Moreover, public attention to the issue slid steadily downward as the topic of 
the Volcker Rule moved from the high-profile legislature, to the regulators’ initial call for public 
comments, to low-profile, in-depth meetings with regulators. By contrast, regulators’ meeting logs 
showed that financial sector actors maintained the pressure throughout all deliberative stages. 
Financial institutions, their lawyers, financial industry trade associations, lobbyists, and policy 
advisors met with federal agencies to discuss the Volcker Rule fifteen times as often as all other 
public interest groups and research or advocacy organizations outside the financial sector. Heads of 
financial institutions also had more one-on-one access to the heads of agencies. 
What emerges from this account of rulemaking around the Volcker Rule is that private 
sector innovation operates as both a normative and technical force to affect regulatory outcomes. 
The decision to frame the Volcker Rule in technical terms is a choice, and one that amplifies existing 
inequalities in participation and voice between financial industry players and others. The experience 
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of notice-and-comment rulemaking around the Volcker Rule speaks to the age-old problem of the 
limits of public deliberation in rule-making, but it is a problem that is exacerbated by the same 
technical expertise that underlies financial innovation in the first place. 
Innovation and Regulation: Three Misperceptions  
Private sector innovation presents a significant challenge to regulators. Regulatory regimes 
that are designed to embrace it and step out of the way, as Basel II did, must assume too much 
about the bona fides and capacity of industry actors and the beneficial impact of market and social 
forces. Regulatory regimes like the ABCP regime in Canada, which establish high-level principles 
and that imagine, without building in verifying mechanisms, that they can trace in advance the limits 
of those principles’ use by highly innovative and self-interested private actors, will be gamed. As the 
Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking account demonstrates, there is no serious appetite for trying to put the 
genie of financial innovation back in its bottle. The normative challenge surrounding it – whether 
private sector financial innovation is beneficial or not, and if so to whom – has not been faced 
squarely. At the regulatory level, the technical nature of the conversation effectively shut out the 
popular forces that might have argued for more extensive limits on financial institutions’ abilities to 
expose consumer banking funds to proprietary trading risks. 
While each case study is different, in each one the regulatory regime exhibits a lack of 
understanding about the phenomenon of innovation it is grappling with. It is crucial to develop a 
better understanding of how innovation intersects with regulatory strategies. This is a substantial 
project, which must consider not only some of the forms innovation can take but also who 
innovates, for what reasons, and with what effects. As a starting point, the three sections below 
highlight some of the assumptions or sets of assumptions that innovation-framing regulation makes 
about innovation. 
 
The Assumption that Innovation is Beneficial, Almost by Definition 
Our definition of the “success” of regulation will depend on our definition of the problem 
to be addressed through regulation. Whether we imagine that financial regulation is primarily about 
the efficient allocation of capital, about protecting investors, about safeguarding the integrity of the 
capital markets, or about some other version of fairness will have consequences for our definition of 
success.  
As noted above, in financial regulation before the crisis, the regulatory agenda was 
substantially framed around the sense that modern financial markets were too fast-moving and 
complex to be regulated in a top-down, traditional way; and that financial innovation brought with it 
great social benefit and as such ought to be fostered and preserved. These were the motivations 
behind explicit innovation-framing regulation of the Basel II variety. While each assumption may be 
partly or even substantially true, each also internalizes an industry-favoring perspective on 
innovation at the expense of a more thoroughgoing inquiry into exactly who benefits from rapid 
financial innovation, and how. 
Taking the first point, global financial markets are indeed fast-moving and complex.  The 
difficulty is that by framing the agenda around the inevitability of speed and complexity in global 
financial markets, innovation-framing regulators lost the ability to articulate a regulatory agenda 
independent from some panicked attempt to “keep up” with industry developments.  This mindset 
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also affected the operative definitions of expertise. Bankers’ quantitative analytical skills were seen to 
be more (or even uniquely) valuable. They drove change, while more policy-oriented or process-
oriented analytical skills were held in comparatively low regard. This left social questions about the 
nature and implications of the speed and complexity of global financial markets – the reasons for it, 
the concerns it might raise, and the broader regulatory reorientation it might demand – insulated 
from interrogation.  
Similarly, because the innovation-framing agenda was set around regulators’ obligation not 
to stifle innovation, there was no opportunity to examine the phenomenon of financial sector 
innovation as a qualitative good. The prevailing view in the years leading up to the financial crisis 
was that all innovation was beneficial virtually by definition, since market forces would winnow out 
any unsound ideas. Thus, “regulators [did] not consider it their role to judge the value of different 
financial products, and in general avoided direct product regulation” (UK Financial Services 
Authority 2009, 49). Rather, a key aim was simply to get out of the way. This made it effectively 
impossible for regulators to act on concerns – indeed, to have concerns – about the OTC derivatives 
market’s extraordinary and unregulated growth. It also prohibited a proper examination of varieties 
of innovation, incentives for innovation, and effects of innovation. And, it was mistaken. Financial 
innovation was undertaken at least as much for rent-seeking and regulation-avoiding as it was for 
any socially beneficial purpose (UK Financial Services Authority 2009, 47-49). 
Yet flawed assumptions about private sector innovation are a more pervasive phenomenon. 
In the first two case studies above, regulatory design was based on expectations about the other 
forces that would provide “backstops” to keep what was essentially self-regulation robust, while 
permitting change and innovation. In the case of Basel II, market discipline and rational self-
interested action on the part of industry were expected to keep leverage and risk-taking within 
reasonable bounds. In the case of ABCP in Canada, the marketability of commercial paper was 
expected to set a built-in limit on its riskiness, and the regulatory design substantially underestimated 
the potential impact of innovation to erode that backstop. With respect to the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
political arena proved not to be a space where the benefits of innovation – meaning not only the 
more efficient allocation of capital or national competitiveness but also its contribution to broader 
social welfare – could be meaningfully debated. Popular politics were not a counterweight to 
economic power and backroom influence. At the regulatory level, to the extent that notice-and-
comment rulemaking is premised on the idea that meaningful public input is important to both the 
quality of regulatory rules, and their legitimacy – in other words, that public consultation through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking thus far has not provided a “backstop” to limit backroom 
influence. 
 
The Assumption that the Regulatory Moment is the Important One  
Intentionally innovation-framing strategies like Basel II are based on an appreciation for how 
hard it is to regulate a chimeric object like financial innovation through a time-bound, formal tool 
like regulation. To be clear, we should not expect to have more success by papering over factual 
uncertainty with artificially clear legal constructs, so long as the regulatory object continues to shape-
shift. Yet we should not imagine that this is all that can be done. A flawed assumption behind the 
Basel II design but even more so the ABCP and Dodd-Frank rulemaking design is that the regulatory 
moment is the crucial one.  
In fact, the spaces before and behind formal regulation were at least as important to the 
regulatory outcomes described above. In the Canadian ABCP Crisis, asset-backed instruments 
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created by bankers were pushed through a disclosure exemption in securities regulation – a space 
that was never intended to make risky products available to retail investors. The technical work that 
underpinned ABCP was both consequential and antecedent to the regulatory moment, but the 
regulatory structure was effectively oblivious to it. It contained no capacity to register the changed 
nature of commercial paper, let alone to evaluate it in any meaningful fashion. In this regard, the 
explicit innovation-framing Basel II structure fares better. At least it registers the fact of innovation 
and innovation’s effect on its predecessor accord, Basel I. It tries to put in place regulatory 
scaffolding based on “strong internal control systems”, regulatory supervision, and enhanced 
disclosure. Its difficulty is that it incorporates by reference proprietary industry risk modeling as 
some form of best practice, based on assumptions about how it will function, without having put in 
place the reflexive regulatory infrastructure needed to critically evaluate it.  
Just as consequential is the space after formal law-making, and after public attention has died 
down (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). As the Volcker Rule account demonstrates, it matters very 
much which parties are still in the room at the point at which important details get determined. 
Years ago, Louis Kaplow observed that rules-based regulation imposes costs ex ante, on regulators, 
while principles-based regulation imposes costs ex post, on a more extensive set of actors (Kaplow 
1992). But principles also present opportunities ex post for well-resourced actors to help shape the 
detailed content of regulation. Lay people do not generally have the expertise to speak to the kinds 
of significant technocratic details that underlie things like the implementation of the Volcker Rule. 
Therefore, once the choice is made to treat the question of how to regulate financial innovation as a 
technocratic one rather than a policy one, it is possible to develop public agreements about 
mechanisms like the Volcker Rule that allay what Fiona Haines calls “sociocultural” risk (Haines 
2011), without actually having much real impact on influential players’ interests. The Volcker Rule 
persists as a symbolic device but, in practical terms, it can be hollowed out after the fact.viii  
Moving the detailed decision making process to a later temporal stage can be a wise choice, 
if one can design a process beyond the political moment that permits a more thorough, meaningful 
analysis of the issues at hand. But agreement on principles (as opposed to rules) can also just defer 
hard choices, causing normative or power battles to go underground. This may well be part of the 
Volcker Rule story. Establishing formal consultation processes such as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking around politically charged and consequential issues like the Volcker Rule has its merits. 
However, where skeletal statutory language is used effectively to “punt” fundamentally political 
questions into insular arenas focused on technocratic details beyond most peoples’ expertise, public 
consultation will be cosmetic at best. Worse yet, if an agreement on principles is actually masking 
not only a public, but a regulatory incapacity to understand or work with the details of regulatory 
implementation – as was the case in the United Kingdom around principles-based prudential 
regulation (Financial Services Authority Internal Audit Division 2008), or in the US around the CSE 
Program (SEC 2008) – then the regulator will simply have ceded the regulatory field to private 
actors. The difference between what Ayres and Braithwaite call “enforced self-regulation”, and 
outright deregulation, lies in that gap. It matters very much what back-end processes are in place, 
exactly, through which ex post indeterminacy will be resolved. 
 
The Assumption that Regulation Sits Outside Innovation and is Not Directly Implicated by 
It 
The gaps between a legal construct and reality are instructive when looking at the financial 
crisis and the definition of regulatory success. Some gaps are the product of politics. For example, 
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the mismatch between the scope of a problem and the jurisdiction of the regulators charged with 
doing something about it also produces structural gaps: witness the CSE Program’s necessarily 
voluntary compliance regime, or the jurisdictional mismatch between global financial institutions and 
national financial regulators.  
More central to present purposes, structural gaps can also be the product of attempts to 
manage change through regulatory tool choice. There is a reflexive relationship between regulation, 
and innovation. Looking at regulation from the perspective of the innovator’s perspective helps us 
to identify the weak spots, tools, and competitive opportunities embedded in the regulatory 
structure. The gaps can be a product of the porous nature of innovation-framing regulation – for 
example, the gap around regulatory risk analysis which was left to be filled by financial institutions’ 
proprietary risk modeling software. On the other hand, in places such as the securities law 
exemption for safe investments that opened the path for the ABCP Crisis in Canada, the gaps were 
the product of the opposite problem – of overly rigid legal or insufficiently context-sensitive forms 
being used, through unanticipated financial innovation, in ways never intended.ix As difficult a task 
as it may be, developing viable regulatory responses to extensive and continuous private sector 
innovation requires careful attention to these interactions, and an appreciation for just how much 
regulatory structure interacts with and is affected by private sector innovation within its bounds. 
Conclusion 
The regulation of financial innovation has turned out to be highly porous, in both intentional 
and unintentional ways, to the interests of the financial industry actors involved. The third case 
study, of the Volcker Rule, reminds us that politics, including politically acceptable accounts of 
innovation, shape and limit the scope of regulatory conversations about how to handle innovation. 
It also reminds us that there is no such thing as value-neutral, objective, purely technocratic 
regulation. Regulatory choices inevitable require trade-offs between policy priorities, in ways that 
differentially affect different constituencies. Developing functional regulation in environments 
characterized by rapid and continual private sector innovation requires careful examination of 
contemporary assumptions about innovation, the regulatory moment, and the relationship between 
innovation and regulation. 
Part of the way forward must be to stop pretending that by harnessing private sector 
innovation, we can create simply “better regulation” (Tiner 2006) that can make everyone happy at 
once. The large policy choices at stake, and the attendant deep disagreements and conflicting 
interests, will not be resolved through some magical step change in technical regulatory (or financial) 
expertise. Moreover, financial expertise, while celebrated in programs like Basel II, is not the only 
kind of expertise required to chart a path forward for financial regulation. The regulation of financial 
sector innovation in recent years in no way counts as successful, if what we care about is 
transparency, accountability, or the bending of the arc of private innovation toward greater social 
benefit than the market can produce on its own. Effective financial regulation still demands that a 
public-minded, future-oriented policy perspective be represented. Whether or not we understand the 
technical intricacies of a particular financial innovation, we should be prepared to engage in a debate 
about the policy implications associated with finance. As part of this, we may need to consider 
whether the democratic mechanisms we have in place now are even notionally sufficient to give 
citizens a stake in the issues that so directly affect their material and social wellbeing, the mechanics 
of which are buried in highly technical and ultimately inaccessible regulatory conversations (or else 
in transnational spaces marked by real democratic deficits).x 
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Then – and this is something new in the context of technique-driven, efficiency-based 
modern regulatory approaches – we want to continue to use those public values as measures against 
which to assess the details that get filled in behind, between, and around regulation, as well as to 
assess the decision-making mechanisms we rely on for filling in those details. Normative questions 
are sometimes pushed out of technical conversations about regulation, on the grounds that 
evidence-based policy should not be ideologically driven. What this fails to appreciate is that in the 
absence of conscious normative choices and conscious attention to the back-end implementation 
stage of regulation, our collective trajectory will be determined by an opportunity structure in which 
influential and sophisticated institutional actors very often will get their way.  
At a technical level, effective regulation of private sector innovation also requires a much 
clearer and more nuanced understanding of innovation than it currently has. The regulation of 
financial innovation, particularly securitization and derivatives, has not actually engaged directly with 
the question of what innovation is. This failure, coupled with an almost romantic view of innovation 
as a monolithic and unmitigated good, means that innovation-framing regulation has sometimes 
forged ahead based on a partial and even mistaken understanding of the phenomenon at the core of 
its project. Thinking clearly about our choices requires a better sense of how and for whose 
purposes innovation develops; and of who, exactly, these private innovators are that we should 
accord them so much autonomy in their creative endeavors. 
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i Thanks to participants at the December 2012 Annals Workshop : Organizational Challenges to Regulatory 
Enforcement and Compliance, held at MIT Anthropology. In particular, thank you to Matthew Desmond, Fiona Haines, 
and Nancy Reichman for exceptionally helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
ii This is not to say that scholars working in the area were not interested in moving beyond the limits of law, for example 
to address problems in corporate ethical conduct in ways that traditional regulation had proved incapable of doing. 
Among others see, e.g., Parker 2002. 
iii On the origins of securitization, see Quinn 2010; Hearing on Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending 
While Preserving Access to Credit 2003. On derivatives, see, e.g., Stout 1999, 704-05, 712-34. For a straightforward 
explanation of what securitization and derivatives are, see Schwarcz 2002. 
iv The precise boundaries of what Lobel calls the “Renew Deal” are not the same as the boundaries of what I describe as 
flexible regulation, but this observation applies to both. 
v The Enron debacle was an example of a company gaming detailed, bright line accounting rules and engaging in 
loophole behavior by creating special purpose vehicles and securitizing its assets. Enron’s collapse prompted a wave of 
attention to rules-based versus principles-based accounting rules, and the role of rules-based US GAAP in making 
Enron’s fraud possible. See, e.g., Ford 2008, 11-13; Bratton and Levitin 2013. 
vi Proposed amendments to this provision aimed to limit this exemption but to date have not been enacted. See British 
Columbia Securities Commission 2011. 
vii In the United States, the credit rating agencies were ineffective right up to the onset of the financial crisis, and their 
independence seems to have been compromised (Lowenstein 2008; Partnoy 1999). The story in Canada is different from 
the American one. In Canada, the Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) imposed more stringent liquidity 
arrangements on some ABCP products in January 2007 and thereby accelerated the moment of reckoning.  
viii Before going to press: update on status of rule 
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ix Beyond this paper’s scope, the corporate share itself also has been disassembled through the use of options and swaps, 
in ways that separate share ownership from economic stake. The result has been the new phenomenon of “empty 
voting” and “vote buying” that has fundamentally undermined corporate accountability and the market for corporate 
control (Hu and Black 2006) 
x This is not to suggest that democratic participation in policy decisions is a panacea. Highly complex issues can be 
susceptible to demagoguery and oversimplification. As Matthew Desmond pointed out at the workshop that fostered 
this issue, public protest has succeeded in shutting down (non-equivalent) scientific inquiry ranging from cloning 
through stem cell research. The Volcker Rule story above also highlights the age-old tension between expertise and 
democracy. The point here is only that it is necessary to re-inject a public voice into a context, innovation-framing 
financial regulation, in which it was utterly absent prior to the financial crisis. 
